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Attorney's Fees for Consumers in Warranty
Actions-An Expanding Role for the U.C.C.?
INTRODUCTION
Public awareness of consumer warranty problems has increased tremen-
dously during the past few decades.' The dependence today's consumers
place on distantly manufactured goods and their reliance on flashy mass
media advertising have led courts and legislatures to take steps protecting
consumers from deceptive selling practices and defective products. 2 To this
end, modern warranty law has struggled to achieve a balance of power
between consumers and warrantors such that the latter will be provoked by
the former to provide a product at a quality and price satisfactory to both.3
This balance of power can be achieved only if full redress for the wronged
consumer is made realistically obtainable. Only then can the consumer impel
the warrantor to repair defects and enhance the caliber of his product.
Since the early 1960's, the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") has
been the principal supplier of consumer warranty protection. 4 One of the
avowed purposes of the U.C.C. is to provide full redress to the aggrieved
buyer.' The U.C.C. provides that the measure of damages for breach of
warranty is generally the difference between the value of the goods as
1. See, e.g., Mueller, Contracts of Frustration, 78 YALE L.J. 576 (1969); Comment,
Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U.
PA. L. REV. 395 (1966). For an enlightening historical analysis tracing developments in the law
of warranty from medieval England to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, see generally Sullivan,
Innovation in the Law of Warranty: The Burden of Reform, 32 HASTINGs L.J. 341 (1980).
2. This Note will not attempt to trace the rise and fall of the ddctrine of caveat emptor.
That topic has been quite adequately treated. See generally Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim
Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966); Traynor, The Ways and Meanings
of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965).
3. The impact of modern warranty law on the balance of power dilemma-is examined in
Rothschild, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Does It Balance Warrantor and Consumer
Interests?, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 335 (1976).
4. The U.C.C. is law today in every state but Louisiana and is also law in the District of
Columbia. The jurisdictions enacting the U.C.C. and the dates of such enactments are listed
in 1 U.L.A. ix (master ed. 1976) (Table 1).
5. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1978). See infra text accompanying notes 41-42. Hereinafter, all
references to the Uniform Commercial Code are to the 1978 official text.
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purchased and their value as warranted. 6 Additionally, the buyer is normally
allowed to recover incidental and consequential damages resulting from the
seller's breach. 7 The U.C.C. clearly strives to make whole the consumer
wronged by a seller's breach of warranty.
Conventional application of U.C.C. remedies will not, however, permit
the warranty plaintiff to be made whole, because he ordinarily will not be
entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred in retaining counsel and
bringing his claim. This result derives from the American rule prohibiting
an award of attorney's fees to the successful ligitant without a statutory or
contractual provision expressly authorizing such an award.8 The U.C.C. does
not explicitly authorize attorney's fees, and the usual seller-oriented purchase
contract is unlikely to be so generous as to grant attorney's fees to successful
troublemakers.9 Therefore, although authority exists to the contrary,' 0 the
American rule precludes the recovery of attorney's fees as incidental or
consequential damages under the U.C.C."
Many legislative bodies have noted the inequities engendered by the Amer-
ican rule and have acted recently to overturn it with legislation in a wide
range of fields.' 2 Several recent statutes, in an attempt to foster quality
control by manufacturers and encourage consumer action if product quality
fails, expressly award reasonable attorney's fees to consumers successful in
6. U.C.C. § 2-714(2) provides: "The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the
difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and
the value they would have had if they had been as warranted .... A useful measure of
damages under this formula is the cost of repair or replacement. See, e.g., R. Clinton Constr.
Co. v. Bryant & Reaves, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Miss. 1977); Downs v. Shouse, 18 Ariz.
App. 225, 501 P.2d 401 (1972).
7. U.C.C. § 2-714(3).
8. See infra notes 19-38 and accompanying text.
9. See Devore v. Bostrom, 632 P.2d 832, 836-37 (Utah 1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting):
This action is not between merchants; it is not between persons of relatively
equal bargaining power. The dispute is between a consumer and a merchant who
dealt on the basis of a contract of adhesion in which the seller specifically provided
for attorney's fees to be paid to it by the buyer in the event the seller found it
necessary to resort to judicial relief.
10. Cady v. Dick Loehr's, Inc., 100 Mich. App. 543, 299 N.W.2d 69 (1980).
11. Virtually every court considering the question has denied recovery. E.g., Keck v. Wacker,
413 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. Ky. 1976); Sellinger v. Freeway Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 110 Ariz.
573, 521 P.2d 1119 (1974); Nick's Auto Sales, Inc. v. Radcliff Auto Sales, Inc., 591 S.W.2d
709 (Ky. App. 1979); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 493
S.W.2d 385, 393 (Mo. App. 1973); Equitable Lumber Corp. v. I.P.A. Land Dev. Corp., 38
N.Y.2d 516, 344 N.E.2d 391, 381 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1976); Hardwick v. Dravo Equip. Co., 279
Or. 619, 569 P.2d 588 (1977); Modine Mfg. Co. v. North East Indep. School Dist., 503 S.W.2d
833 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Devore v. Bostrom, 632 P.2d 832 (Utah 1981); Murray v. Holiday
Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406, 265 N.W.2d 513 (1978).
12. To date, Congress has enacted nearly 100 federal statutes authorizing awards of attor-
ney's fees to successful litigants. See Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is "Rea-
sonable"?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281, 303 n.104 (1977) (collecting 75 such federal statutes); see
also Brock, Statutory Attorney Fees in Texas, 40 TEx. B.J. 139 (1977); Douglas, Statutory
Authorization for Attorney's Fees in New Hampshire, 17 N.H.B.J. 205 (1976).
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warranty suits.' 3 Allowing the recovery of attorney's fees in warranty actions
is becoming increasingly common.' 4 The U.C.C., however, remains con-
strained by the American rule.' 5
This Note explores the desirability of allowing attorney's fees in breach
of warranty actions under the U.C.C. Development of this topic will require
forays into several distinct legal areas. Part I discusses the American rule
and its unfortunate effect on warranty law.' 6 Part II analyzes U.C.C. section
2-715 to determine whether attorney's fees conform to the general intendment
of incidental or consequential damages. Part III is a brief overview of
consumer legislation authorizing attorney's fees in warranty actions. Several
of these statutes are examined to define the extent to which they either
supplant or complement the U.C.C., and to assess the effect they have had
on warranty protection. To the extent a consumer can utilize one of these
statutes, it will be unnecessary to extend conventional remedies offered by
the U.C.C. The Note concludes that modification of U.C.C. substance or
interpretation will be necessary until federal remedies are wielded more often
and effectively or state law is massively revised.
I. THE AMERICAN RULE
English courts have had the authority for several centuries to award
attorney's fees to prevailing litigants.' 7 Although it is not clear why the
13. See infra notes 78-139 and accompanying text. The existence of consumer warranty
statutes authorizing fee-shifting provides arguments both for and against extension of the U.C.C.
to allow the recovery of attorney's fees in consumer warranty actions. These statutes arguably
embody a generalized legislative judgment that consumers need encouragement to litigate war-
ranty disputes; a conclusion which logically should apply regardless of the type of warranty
breached or the product involved. On the other hand, the existence of these statutes might
obviate any need to extend U.C.C. remedies, because a consumer can often utilize a fee-shifting
warranty statute in conjunction with the U.C.C. or alone to recover attorney's fees. This Note
accepts the former argument and attempts to refute the latter.
14. See Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Harrell, 431 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1983); Nobility Homes,
Inc. v. Ballentine, 386 So. 2d 727 (Ala. 1980); Sherer v. DeSalvo, 634 S.W.2d 149 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1982); Hanks v. Pandolfo, 38 Conn. Supp. 447, 450 A.2d 1167 (1982); Black v. Don
Schmid Motor, Inc., 232 Kan. 458, 657 P.2d 517 (1983); Champion Ford Sales, Inc. v. Levine,
49 Md. App. 547, 433 A.2d 1218 (1981); Ventura v. Ford Motor Corp., 180 N.J. Super. 45,
433 A.2d 801 (1981); Massingale v. Northwest Cortez, Inc., 27 Wash. App. 749, 620 P.2d 1009
(1980); Bixby, Judicial Interpretation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 22 AM. Bus. L.J.
125, 154-62 (1984).
15. See infra notes 39-81 and accompanying text.
16. This Note need not argue for the wholesale rejection of the American rule. The com-
mentators listed infra note 20 make the case for its abandonment convincingly enough. This
Note will instead criticize the American rule solely to demonstrate that its operation has prevented
courts from fully exploring the bounds of recoverable damages in one particular type of legal
action: a breach of warranty action brought by a consumer.
17. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967).
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English practice of fee-shifting was not embraced in the United States,' 8 the
American rule now has become so deeply ingrained in this country's legal
system that its general abandonment is highly unlikely. 9 The American rule
has been the subject of both intense criticism 20 and powerful support.2' While
its detractors have demonstrated its many shortcomings, the American rule
has survived on the strength of certain policy justifications. An examination
of these justifications as applied to consumer breach of warranty claims will
be helpful in assessing the merit of the American rule in the field of consumer
warranty protection.
Ironically, the most compelling justification for the American rule mirrors
exactly the most compelling justification for the English rule. Proponents
of the American rule argue that the English rule inhibits access to the courts
because requiring the losing party to pay the prevailing party's attorney's
fees raises the stakes of litigation and discourages the assertion of legitimate
18. Apparently the English rule was originally adopted in the American colonies but was
somehow slowly lost. Professor Ehrenzweig has described this process as a "gradual forgetting"
of the sounder rule. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54
CAtrF. L. REV. 792, 799 (1966). This "gradual forgetting," according to Ehrenzweig, is attributable
to pure historical accident:
IT]here are good reasons for assuming that what is now so often represented as
a noble postulate for restraint of the winner in a chance contest, is actually due to
the simple fact that the New York legislature in 1848, in attempting to perpetuate
what it considered a sound legal rule of recovery of attorneys' fees by the prevailing
party, made the fatal mistake of fixing the amount recoverable in dollars and
cents rather than in percentages of the amount recovered or claimed. It was this
mistake probably that caused lawyers and courts, when rising living costs began
to obscure the real purpose of the statutory amounts of "costs," gradually to
forget the meaning of those amounts.
Id. at 798-99.
19. That the American rule would control in this country's federal courts was settled by a
line of early Supreme Court cases. See Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211 (1872); Day
v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851); Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306
(1796). The Court has recently reaffirmed, in no uncertain terms, the continued vitality of the
rule in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
There are of course exceptions to the American rule. See generally Note, Theories of Recovering
Attorneys' Fees: Exceptions to the American Rule, 47 UMKC L. REV. 566 (1979).
20. See generally Cosway, Attorney's Fees as an Element of Damages, 15 U. CIN. L. REV.
313 (1941); Ehrenzweig, supra note 18; Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fees: Why Not a Cost of
Litigation?, 49 IowA L. REv. 75 (1963); McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's Fees: A New
Method of Financing Legal Services, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 761 (1972); Mayer & Stix, The
Prevailing Party Should Recover Counsel Fees, 8 AKRON L. REV. 426 (1975); Stirling, At-
torney's Fees: Who Should Bear the Burden?, 41 CAL. ST. B.J. 874 (1966); Stoebuck, Counsel
Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. CoLo. L. REV. 202 (1966); Note,
Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REv. 1216 (1967);
Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 636 (1974).
21. Support for the American rule comes primarily from the courts rather than from
commentators. See, e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714,
718 (1966); Mighty Midgets, Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 47 N.Y.2d 12, 21-22, 389 N.E.2d
1080, 1085, 416 N.Y.S.2d 559, 564 (1979).
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but uncertain claims. 22 Advocates of the English rule, on the other hand,
urge that the American rule inhibits access to the courts by failing to- fully
compensate the prevailing litigant. 23 Plaintiffs often forgo meritorious law-
suits because the expense of attorney's fees is greater than the amount sought
to be recovered.2 4 Likewise, defendants often settle meritless lawsuits because
the expense of attorney's fees in defending the claim exceeds the plaintiff's
potential recovery. 2 The primary dispute between the proponents of each
rule simply reflects a basic disagreement as to which rule deters to a greater
extent free access to the courts.
While the final resolution of the access debate must await empirical re-
search, it is safe to postulate that the circumstances of the particular case
determine to a large extent which rule tends to exclude the greater class of
litigants. 26 The American rule appears to deter small claims regardless of
their merit. 27 For instance, even when the legal claim is clear and the facts
undisputed, the amount sought may be insufficient to justify hiring an
attorney and conducting litigation when these expenses will be subtracted
from the recovery: The English rule, on the other hand, appears to deter
claims that are especially uncertain. 28 For example, when the claim is disputed
or rests upon novel legal grounds, the likelihood of success may not justify
its assertion because of the substantial risk that two attorneys, rather than
merely one, will have to be paid.
Although the tremendous diversity of consumer warranty disputes dis-
courages broad generalizations, the American rule probably deters a greater
class of warranty plaintiffs than the English rule. With few exceptions,
consumer warranty claims are trivial in amount compared to virtually any
other type of legal claim.2 9 Damages for breach of warranty do not include
punitive damages, absent fraud.3 0 Nor does the simple warranty action include
22. Mallor, Punitive Attorneys' Fees for Abuses of the Judicial System, 61 N.C.L. REV.
613, 618 (1983); McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element
of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REV. 619, 641 (1931).
23. Mallor, supra note 22, at 616; Walthall, Awards of Attorneys' Fees in the Absence of
Statute: Trends and Prospects in the Fifth Circuit, 10 CuM. L. REV. 359, 362-63 (1979).
24. Mallor, supra note 22, at 616-17.
25. Id. at 617.
26. Walthall, supra note 23, at 366-67 n.22.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. According to the results of a survey by the Center for Auto Safety, a consumer advocacy
group founded by Ralph Nader, even automobile warranty claims-surely one of the most
expensive subjects of breach of warranty suits-typically generate damages only slightly in
excess of $6,000. Nat'l L.J., July 4, 1983, at 40, col. 3.
30. At common law, punitive damages ordinarily are not recoverable for a breach of contract
unless the breach also involves tortious conduct. Kiser v. Gilmore, 2 Kan. App. 2d 683, 587
P.2d 911 (1978). This rule is incorporated into the Uniform Commercial Code under U.C.C.
§ 1-106(1). Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). Incidental and
consequential damages under U.C.C. § 2-715, see infra notes 46-81 and accompanying text,
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claims for personal injury or wrongful death to hike the recovery. The
plaintiff merely seeks a replacement for a defective product or, more typi-
cally, a refund of the purchase price, plus incidental and consequential
damages. Only when the product's purchase price is unusually high will the
plaintiff's recovery after a trial exceed his attorney and litigation expenses.3'
If consumer warranty protection is to be truly effective, the consumer must
be able to afford to have his case heard in court. The American rule and
the relative insignificance of the amount of the claim combine to deny
warranty plaintiffs fair access to the courts.
Another asserted justification for the American rule is that it simplifies
the task of already-congested courts. 32 When each litigant is responsible for
his own attorney's fees, the court is not required to hear motions, evidence,
and arguments on the proper amount of recoverable fees. 33 The English rule
concededly can lengthen litigation by placing this extra burden on the courts.
As applied to consumer warranty actions, however, this justification is stripped
of much of its merit. The initial effect of abandoning the American rule
would be to stimulate the assertion of those claims that were previously
deterred-small but legitimate warranty claims. The manufacturer, no longer
wielding the in terrorem power of the American rule, will be much more
inclined to consider settlement, noting both the legitimacy of the claim and
the modest amount sought.3 4 Few of the suits spurred by discarding the
American rule would even proceed to trial, and any potential for litigation
protraction would be negated.35
do not include punitive damages. Sims v. Ryland Group, Inc., 37 Md. App. 470, 378 A.2d 1
(1966). But see Coyle Chevrolet Co. v. Carrier, 397 N.E.2d 1283 (Ind. App. 1978) (award of
punitive damages allowed where defendant hirfiself presented issue of punitive damages to jury).
31. Even when an automobile is the subject of a warranty suit, the amount of attorney's
fees incurred in bringing the suit to trial are typically scarcely less than the amount of the
recovery. See Black v. Don Schmid Motors, Inc., 232 Kan. 458, 657 P.2d 517 (1983) (plaintiff
awarded $3,000 in attorney's fees under fee-shifting provision of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act).
32. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1966); Oelrichs
v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211 (1872).
33. In Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 231 (1872), the Court expressed this precise
concern: "A reference to a master, or an issue to a jury, might be necessary to ascertain the
proper amount, and this grafted litigation might possibly be more animated and protracted
than that in the original cause." See also Mallor, supra note 22, at 618.
34. See R. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 350-51 (1972). Posner argues that reim-
bursement of attorney's fees would "encourage settlements by giving the parties added incentive
to estimate the likely outcome of litigation correctly: the party has more to lose from an
incorrect estimate, if one consequence of litigating and losing is that he must reimburse the
other party's litigation expenses." Id. at 351.
35. In any event, in the frequent cases when statute, policy, or contract has mandated fee-
shifting, the courts have regularly assumed the extra burden of determining proper awards.
Presumably, the courts over time have developed a certain amount of proficiency in this area.
See generally Berger, supra note 12 (suggesting an analytical framework to be used in fixing
fees: hours justifiably expended, multiplied by the attorney's market rate, multiplied by the risk
of nonrecovery).
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The manufacturer's inclination to settle may indeed have a more far-
reaching effect. Once the manufacturer can no longer depend on the Amer-
ican rule to deter claims against him, he will have to deter claims by
improving product quality. This would be the most socially desirable assur-
ance against breach of warranty claims, more palatable than the present
means of deterrence, the prohibition of fee-shifting. Abandoning the Amer-
ican rule in the field of consumer warranties, then, could eventually lead to
enhanced quality control as well as enhanced consumer redress. Improving
product quality and consumer remedies are in fact the twin goals of the
recent wave of consumer warranty statutes, most of which award attorney's
fees to successful warranty plaintiffs.16
Other justifications for the American rule do not require application to
the consumer warranty context for repudiation.3 7 The most persuasive of
these justifications is that attorney's fees are simply too remote from the
original injury to be recoverable as compensable damages . 3 The analysis of
the remoteness question is identical in all actions for damages, but in the
breach of warranty context the analysis takes on an added statutory dimen-
sion. Section 2-715 of the U.C.C. defines the extent to which items of
damage resulting from the seller's breach may be recovered. These items of
damage are termed incidental and consequential damages. A decision to
allow a particular item of damage under section 2-715 represents a deter-
mination that it is not too removed from the original injury to be included
in the measure of damages. Whether attorney's fees are too remote to be
recoverable under the language of section 2-715 is the subject of the next
section of this Note.
II. SECTION 2-715
Section 2-715 of the U.C.C. does not explicitly provide for the recovery
of attorney's fees. The U.C.C. draftsmen were, of course, aware of the
36. See infra note 91.
37. Proponents of the American rule fear that prevailing attorneys may charge higher fees
if such fees can be shifted to the opponent. McCormick, supra note 22, at 639. The weakness
of this argument lies in the court's discretion to award only a reasonable fee. McLaughlin,
supra note 20, at 781.
Another justification for the American rule is that it correctly allocates litigation decisions to
the parties and their attorneys, an arrangement more efficient than one authorizing official
review. Walthall, supra note 23, at 368-69 (hypothesizing that the desire for decentralized private
decisionmaking may explain in large part the adoption of the American rule in this country).
But the nineteenth-century philosophy that recognized the superiority of individual bargaining
and contract law is no longer persuasive. Modern courts and legislatures have often found it
expedient to override the interest in private decisionmaking when other policies are deemed
more pressing. See generally G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); Ellinghaus, In
Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YA L.J. 757 (1969).
38. In Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 197 (1878), the Court noted: "The fees of
counsel in prosecuting this case were no part of the consequences naturally resulting from the
action of the defendants in suing out the decree and warrant in bankruptcy. They were not
what the defendants ought to have foreseen."
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American rule and presumably intended that the section work no change
upon prior law. If the intent of the drafters is temporarily put aside, however,
as resting upon a premise that is flawed when applied to the consumer
warranty context 9 and has been eroded by recent warranty legislation, 40 then
one is left with only the words of section 2-715. Guidance in interpreting
this section can be found in two of the U.C.C.'s general introductory
provisions, sections 1-106(1) and 1-103. Section 1-106(1) declares that "[t]he
remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the end that
the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party
had fully performed." ' 4' This section supports any construction of section
2-715 which results in the prevailing litigant being made whole. Because a
successful plaintiff cannot be made whole when he cannot recover his at-
torney's fees, section 1-106(1) clashes on its face with the American rule. 42
The force of section 1-106(1) is tempered by the effect of section 1-103.
Section 1-103 provides that, unless displaced by particular provisions, prin-
ciples of the common law should supplement all provisions of the U.C.C.43
Because the American rule represents the well-established common law in
this country, section 1-103 supports its incorporation into the U.C.C. Never-
theless, the continued vitality of the common law demands that the law
change to better reflect shifting societal values.4 The consumer protection
movement in this country represents just such a shift in societal values. If,
on consumer protection grounds, a convincing argument can be made that
attorney's fees should be allowed in warranty actions, the common law is
capable of giving legal status to that argument.4 5 Section 1-103 need not bar
in perpetuity the recovery of attorney's fees under the U.C.C. simply because
the current practice in this country is to deny such a recovery.
39. See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 82-139 and accompanying text.
41. U.C.C. § 1-106(1).
42. Contra Merrimack Farmers Exch., Inc. v. Elliott, Ill N.H. 121, 276 A.2d 258 (1971);
Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 285 N.E.2d 311, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1972).
43. U.C.C. § 1-103 provides:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law
and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract,
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake,
bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provi-
sions.
44. As the Court noted in Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 383 (1933), "tilt has been
said so often as to have become axiomatic that the common law is not immutable but flexible,
and by its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions." See also Brooks v. Robinson,
259 Ind. App. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972); Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543
(1949).
45. Indeed, the common law rule regarding attorney's fees in this country apparently drifted
away from the practice of fee-shifting during the colonial years for wholly unpersuasive reasons.
See supra note 18.
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A. Incidental Damages
Section 2-715(1) of the U.C.C. defines the scope of incidental damages. 46
Incidental damages are "intended to provide reimbursement for the buyer
who incurs reasonable expenses in connection with the handling of rightfully
rejected goods or goods whose acceptance may be justifiably revoked. '47
Section 2-715(1) lists illustrations of several typical kinds of incidental dam-
ages, but this list is not intended to be exhaustive.4 Courts generally have
interpreted section 2-715(1) narrowly, awarding incidental damages in two
broad categories only: when expenses have been incurred in either handling
nonconforming goods 49 or effecting cover.5 0 Other more attenuated, and
usually more significant, damages are termed consequential and are awarded,
if at all, under section 2-715(2).
At least one court, however, has strayed from this traditional interpretation
by holding that section 2-715(1) can be read to include attorney's fees as
incidental damages resulting from a seller's breach of warranty. In Cady v.
Dick'Leohr's, Inc.,5" involving the sale of a defective motor home, the buyer
prevailed in a breach of warranty action. The trial court, in addition to
awarding $7,155 in damages 5 2 awarded the plaintiff $2,930 in attorney's
fees. " The Michigan Court of Appeals agreed that attorney's fees could be
awarded under section 2-715(1) at the discretion of the trial court as a
46. U.C.C. § 2-715(1) provides:
Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include expenses reasonably
incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods
rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions
in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to
the delay or other breach.
47. U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 1.
48. Id.
49. E.g., Broglie v. MacKay-Smith, 541 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1976) (expenses for care and
feeding of lame horse); Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1971) (repair and
replacement of mechanical parts damaged by unsuitable oil); La Villa Fair v. Lewis Carpet
Mills, Inc., 219 Kan. 395, 548 P.2d 825 (1976) (handling, transportation, and storage of defective
carpeting); Lanners v. Whitney, 247 Or. 223, 428 P.2d 398 (1967) (care and custody of plane
misrepresented as airworthy); Devore v. Bostrom, 632 P.2d 832 (Utah 1981) (insurance, license
plates, lost wages, and interest on the purchase price of defective automobile).
50. E.g., Jay V. Zimmerman Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D. Mo.
1971) (buyer allowed to recover additional transportation costs of shipping cover by air-freight
because of shortage of time); Kohlenberger, Inc. v. Tyson's Foods, Inc., 256 Ark. 548, 510
S.W.2d 555 (1974) (absence of allegations in pleadings by buyer as to cover did not preclude
recovery as incidental or consequential damages); Duff v. Bonner Bldg. Supply, Inc., 649 P.2d
391 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982) (cost of removing defective paneling and installing replacement
paneling); S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Reeves Red-E-Mix Concrete, Inc., 39 Ill. App. 3d 353, 350
N.E.2d 321 (1976) (cost of obtaining additional concrete after seller's refusal to deliver agreed
amount).
51. 100 Mich. App. 543, 299 N.W.2d 69 (1980).
52. Id. at 545, 299 N.W.2d at 70.
53. Id. at 548, 299 N.W.2d at 71.
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"reasonable expense incident to the breach." 5 4 Considering the novelty and
potentially enormous consequences of its holding, the court's analysis was
unusual. Although the decision was grounded on language contained in
section 2-715(1), the court gave no indication that it properly understood
what is meant by an incidental damage. The court did not even acknowledge
the existence of the American rule.55 For its primary support, the court curtly
likened the action to one under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act,56
which grants discretion to the trial court to award attorney's fees as costs. 5
7
The Cady court's result is defensible even if its reasoning is not. The
Michigan Environmental Protection Act represents a public interest field in
which the legislature obviously determined that the American rule inhibited
the important policy objective of stimulating litigation. For this reason the
statute expressly authorizes judicial discretion to apportion costs. While
consumer warranty protection is also an area of great public concern, its
primary tool of implementation-the U.C.C.-makes no such explicit au-
thorization in section 2-715(1). To the extent the court's holding is based
upon similarities in statutory wording, it is highly questionable.
But the policy underlying the Cady decision is clear and commendable:
when application of the American rule produces an unfair result, statutory
language capable of being interpreted as conferring trial court discretion to
skirt the rule should be so construed. The court's implicit message seems to
be that consumer protection is a field as crucial to the public consciousness
as environmental protection, and hence plaintiffs asserting wrongs in each
field should be treated analogously. The validity of this proposition can
hardly be doubted, but the court's use of section 2-715(1) to invoke a broad
discretion unlikely to have been intended by its draftsmen is doubtful indeed.
The Cady court based its holding on language contained in the final clause
of section 2-715(1): "any other reasonable expense incident to the ...
breach.''58 The court apparently considered this clause to be a catch-all
provision and thus broad and discretionary in nature. Indeed, the language
of the clause as commonly understood might support the court's interpre-
tation. 59 The overwhelming weight of authority suggests otherwise.6 The
54. Id. at 549, 299 N.W.2d at 72 (quoting from Michigan statute identical to U.C.C. § 2-
715(l)).
55. The American rule governs in Michigan courts. Newport West Condominium Ass'n v.
Veniar, 134 Mich. App. 1, 17, 350 N.W.2d 818, 824 (1984); Fleischer v. Buccilli, 13 Mich.
App. 135, 139, 163 N.W.2d 637, 639 (1968).
56. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1201-.1207 (West Supp. 1984).
57. Id. § 691.1203(3). See, e.g., Taxpayers & Citizens in the Public Interest v. Department
of State Highways, 70 Mich. App. 385, 245 N.W.2d 761 (1976).
58. U.C.C. § 2-715(1).
59. The word "incident" in this context is defined as "dependent on or appertaining to
another thing." WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1142 (3d ed. 1981). This
definition refers purely to causation. Since the attorney's fees originated in the seller's breach,
it is not unreasonable to view attorney's fees as being "incident" to the breach.
60. See cases cited supra note 11.
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illustrative types of incidental damages listed in the statute, 61 while not
intended to be definitive, are intended to shed light upon the exact nature
of incidental damages. Those items listed are typical recoverable expenses.
In order to be considered an incidental damage, an expense sought to be
recovered must be either one of the expenses listed or so closely related to
those listed that it can be considered of the same type. As the enumerated
expenses demonstrate, incidental damages generally "relate to or directly
involve the goods" themselves, 62 arising within the scope of the immediate
buyer-seller transaction. 63 Judged by this standard, attorney's fees cannot be
considered incidental damages because they do not closely resemble expenses
incurred in either handling nonconforming goods or effecting cover. Attor-
ney's fees are usually incurred long after nonconforming goods have been
returned and cover has been effected. Although they might be a "reasonable
expense incident to the delay or other breach" as that phrase is commonly
understood, attorney's fees are in fact one step removed from those expenses
normally recovered under section 2-715(1).
Since incidental damages "connote a narrow ambit"64 restricted to expenses
initimately connected with the seller's breach, section 2-715(1) is not a proper
vehicle for allowing the recovery of attorney's fees under the U.C.C. The
alternative, section 2-715(2), permits the reimbursement of a multitude of
expenses far less closely associated with the seller's breach. If attorney's fees
are to be recoverable for successful consumer warranty plaintiffs, absent
amendment of the U.C.C., section 2-715(2) must provide the basis for the
recovery.
B. Consequential Damages
It is widely agreed that section 2-715(2),61 which defines the scope of
consequential damages, incorporates the test of reasonable foreseeability
61. U.C.C. § 2-715(1). See supra note 46.
62. 4 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMECIAL. CODE § 2-708:11, at 389 (3d ed. 1981).
63. P6troleo Brasileiro, S.A., Petrobras v. Ameropan Oil Corp., 372 F. Supp. 503, 508
(E.D.N.Y. 1974), quoted in Hofmann v. Stoller, 320 N.W.2d 786, 792 (N.D. 1982). The Petroleo
court drew a distinction between, on the one hand, recoverable incidental damages such as
transportation, storage, and resale expenses and, on the other, "losses incurred by the non-
breaching party in its dealings, often with third parties, which were a proximate result of the
breach." Id. (emphasis added). The latter are recoverable as consequential damages under
U.C.C. § 2-715(2) if reasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting.
64. McGinnis v. Wentworth Chevrolet Co., 295 Or. 494, 502, 668 P.2d 365, 370 (1983).
65. U.C.C. § 2-715(2) provides:
Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs
of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and
which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach
of warranty.
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derived from the classic case of Hadley v. Baxendale.66 An alternative inter-
pretation of Hadley, the "tacit agreement" test, was expressly rejected by
the U.C.C. draftsmen, 67 as it had been rejected by courts and scholars prior
to promulgation of the U.C.C. 6s Under section 2-715(2), in order for a buyer
to recover consequential damages, he need not prove that he-and the buyer
specifically contemplated the likelihood of certain damages and that the
seller had actually assumed liability for such damages. Instead, the test is
objective: "the seller is liable for consequential damages in all cases where
he had reason to know of the buyer's general or particular requirements at
the time of contracting.' '69
The distinction in section 2-715(2) between the buyer's general and par-
ticular requirements is noteworthy. This distinction reflects the two basic
types of contract damages noted in Hadley: (1) those arising naturally from
the breach (general requirements), and (2) those due to "special circum-
stances" surrounding the sale and made known to the seller (particular
requirements) .70
Under section 2-715(2), the seller is normally charged with knowledge of
the buyer's general requirements, while particular requirements of the buyer
generally must be communicated to the seller. 71 For instance, most courts
66. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 10-4 (1972).
67. U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 2. The "tacit agreement" test allows a buyer to recover
damages arising from his "special circumstances" only if the seller "fairly may be supposed
to have assumed consciously, or to have warranted [the buyer] reasonably to suppose that it
was assumed, [such liability] when the contract was made." Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton
Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 544 (1903). Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, further stated that
the "mere notice to a seller of some interest or probable action of the buyer is not enough
necessarily and as a matter of law to charge the seller with special damage on that account if
he fails to deliver the goods." Id. at 545.
68. The U.C.C. test of reasonable foreseeability was presaged by the Restatement of Con-
tracts:
In awarding damages, compensation is given for only those injuries that the
defendant had reason to foresee as a probable result of his breach when the
contract was made. If the injury is one that follows the breach in the usual course
of events, there is sufficient reason for the defendant to foresee it; otherwise, it
must be shown specifically that the defendant had reason to know the facts and
to foresee the injury.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 330 (1932). See also Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman
Indus. Ltd., [1949] 2 K.B. 528; 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1008-12 (1964); 11 S.
WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1357 (3d ed. 1968).
69. U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 3 (emphasis added).
70. Commentators have differed as to whether Hadley v. Baxendale distinguishes between
two or three classes of contract damages. Compare Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of
Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1199-201 (1964) (recognizing the two-test U.C.C. approach)
with Case Note, Uniform Commercial Code- §§ 2-714 & 2-71S-Consequential Damages A ward-
R.I. Lampus Co. v. Neville Cement Products Corp., 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 153, 156-57 (1976)
(adopting a three-test approach). Any difference between these varying interpretations of Hadley
would appear, in any event, to be semantic only. Wallach, The Buyer's Right to Monetary
Damages, 14 U.C.C. L.J. 236, 247-48 (1982).
71. U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 3.
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today, especially in the manufacturing context, recognize that lost profits
are a natural consequence of a seller's breach of warranty and are recoverable
as consequential damages regardless of the seller's knowledge of the buyer's
specific needs? 2 Outside the manufacturing context it may be far less fore-
seeable that a breach will lead to a loss of profits.7 In these cases, the
buyer's special needs must be communicated to the seller. If the buyer's
special needs are not acceptable to the seller, the seller may refuse to sell
or may contractually limit the buyer's remedy. If the buyer chooses not to
accept any limitations of his remedies, he may buy elsewhere.
Attorney's fees must be considered, under any definition, a general re-
quirement of the buyer since they arise inevitably in the ordinary course of
events when the seller's warranty is breached and the buyer sues. Despite
the self-evident nature of this proposition, attorney's fees have never been
considered recoverable consequential damages.7 4 This result stems more from
rote invocation of the American rule than from a realistic interpretation of
section 2-715(2). No single item of damage in a breach of warranty suit is
more likely to be incurred or likely to be more significant than the expense
of employing an attorney. At one time many years ago it may not have
been foreseeable or necessary for an injured party to retain a lawyer to seek
recompense.7" Today, the complexity of the legal machinery absolutely re-
quires that an injured party hire an attorney; 76 no seller can express surprise
upon learning that a buyer has hired an attorney to bring a breach of
warranty action. 77 The only factor preventing the foreseeability of attorney's
72. Lost profits are "the most commonly litigated and doubtless the most often sought
after item of consequential damages." J. WHiTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 66, § 10-4, at 319.
The most important lost profits case in the manufacturing context is Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
438 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1971). Lost profits must be established with reasonable certainty. E.g.,
Valley Die Cast Corp. v. A.C.W., Inc., 25 Mich. App. 321, 181 N.W.2d 303 (1970).
73. English Whipple Sailyard, Ltd. v. The Yawl Ardent, 459 F. Supp. 866, 877 (W.D. Pa.
1978) (buyer's desire to charter boat unknown to seller).
74. See cases cited supra note 11.
75. See supra note 38.
76. See Stirling, supra note 20, at 878:
[E]ven the most simple legal matter cannot be effectuated without at least con-
sulting an attorney. The mechanics and procedures of the administration of justice
have become so complex that the layman is practically forced to seek the advice
of counsel in matters which were once somewhat within his ability to comprehend.
Particularly is this true in the more heavily populated and rapidly growing areas
of the state and country.
77. An illustration might prove useful. B wishes to buy a microwave oven, and finds one
he likes at S's store. B, an especially cautious consumer, tells S: "I would like to buy this
microwave oven, but of course I am worried about its quality. If I have trouble with it and
am not satisfied with your attempts at repair, I assure you I will hire a lawyer, bring suit, and
expect you to pay my attorney's fees if I win. Agreed?" S, confident in the quality of his
product, agrees. If B sues and wins, presumably S will be liable for B's attorney's fees. This
result is dictated not only by the particular requirements rule of U.C.C. § 2-715(2), but also
by the provision of the American rule that attorney's fees are recoverable when called for
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fees in consumer breach of warranty actions is the in terrorem effect of the
American rule. The same rule that initially deters the assertion of the claim
may ironically limit the recovery of a consumer who does successfully bring
a claim. 71
Attorney's fees appear to be sufficiently foreseeable to be recoverable as
consequential damages under section 2-715(2). The American practice pro-
hibiting fee-shifting, however, summarily precludes such recovery. A court
which violates the American rule and allows attorney's fees under the U.C.C.
invites admonition, as the Cady decision demonstrates. 79 Section 2-715 could
simply be amended to expressly authorize the recovery of attorney's fees to
consumers successful in breach of warranty actions. Amending section 2-
715 would preserve the integrity of the American rule while furthering the
policies discussed previously. 0 Amendment of the U.C.C., although uncom-
mon, is not unheard of.8 ' It may, in any event, be unnecessary. An increasing
amount of consumer warranty legislation achieves much the same result
without altering the U.C.C. In light of this trend, amendment of the U.C.C.
contractually.
The contractual nature of the understanding between buyer and seller in this hypothetical
is apparent. The crucial issue, however, is whether the buyer must inform the seller that, in
the event of a breach of warranty, the buyer will bring suit and hire an attorney who must be
paid. Section 2-715(2) does not require that the seller consciously accept liability for certain
expenses, as the seller did in the hypothetical. Instead, the seller is liable for all reasonably
foreseeable expenses. Attorney's fees are plainly foreseeable in a breach of warranty suit.
78. Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit has recently concluded that there is more to Hadley
than the rule of reasonable foreseeability. In EVRA Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951
(7th Cir. 1982), the plaintiff suffered a loss of profits due to the defendant bank's failure to
transfer funds when instructed by wire to do so. Posner, writing for the court, used Hadley
to limit the plaintiff's recovery. Posner examined Hadley and found it to be merely a specific
application of the principle that "the costs of the untoward consequence of a course of dealings
should be borne by that party who was able to avert the consequence at least cost and failed
to do so." Id. at 957. Posner found that the plaintiff in EVRA was the least costly risk avoider
and denied recovery for loss of profits.
This economic approach to Hadley cannot be applied to deny the recovery of attorney's
fees to consumers successful in breach of warranty actions. Under EVRA, the preventive
measures available to both parties are analyzed and balanced at the time the breach occurred.
See id. at 957-59. A consumer aggrieved by a breach of warranty cannot take precautions to
prevent the expense of attorney's fees, short of the economically undesirable action of forgoing
the claim entirely. On the other hand, if it were well-established that prevailing consumers
could recover attorney's fees in warranty actions, the manufacturer would be aware of this
potential loss and would have incentive to avoid similar expenses in the future. In any event,
regardless of which party can most efficiently avoid the risk of paying an attorney, Posner has
previously stated that allowing attorney's fees to prevailing litigants generally is economically
efficient in that it encourages settlements. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 350-51
(1972); see supra note 34.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 51-60.
80. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
81. Section 2-316, for example, has been a frequent subject of state variation. See ALA.
CODE § 7-2-316 (1984); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-316 (1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 106, § 2-316 (West 1984). Mississippi did not enact § 2-316 or an equivalent section.
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may be superfluous. That determination necessarily depends upon the scope
and effectiveness of this new legislation.
III. CONSUMER WARRANTY LEGISLATION
Although the American rule ordinarily bars an award of attorney's fees
under the U.C.C., plaintiffs today recover these expenses occasionally when
successful in warranty actions. Legislators at both the state and federal levels
have recognized that the U.C.C. was written for merchants, not for con-
sumers. The U.C.C. is founded in large part upon the principle of freedom
of contract and governs effectively transactions between parties of equal
bargaining power s. 8  It provides precious little protection, however, for a
consumer who has little power to influence the terms of the sale. 3 In an
effort to enhance consumer leverage, a considerable body of legislation
designed to beef up the U.C.C. has arisen recently. This wave of consumer
legislation has essentially two objectives. The first goal is to increase the
quality of products sold in the market, ideally through warranty competition
among manufacturers. The second goal is to afford consumers better rem-
edies. In particular, much of this legislation expressly awards attorney's fees
to successful consumer plaintiffs.
A. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
The most significant legislative enlargement of U.C.C. remedies is un-
doubtedly provided by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.14 Passed by Con-
gress in 1975, the Magnuson-Moss Act is the first federal statute dealing
with the law of warranty." It provides a federal cause of action for consumers
82. U.C.C. § 1-102 comment 2. See also Bunn, Freedom of Contract Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 2 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 59 (1960).
83. See generally Whitford, Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study of the
Automobile Warranty, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 1006.
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1982). The entire name of the statute is the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, originally enacted as Act of Jan. 4,
1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, §§ 101-12, 88 Stat. 2183.
85. The Act drew considerable attention in the literature immediately after its passage. See
generally C. RErrz, CONSUMER PROTECTION UNDER THE MAGNUSON-Moss WARRANTY ACT (1978);
Brickey, The Magnuson-Moss Act-An Analysis of the Efficacy of Federal Warranty Regulation
as a Consumer Protection Tool, 18 SANTA CIARA L. REv. 73 (1978); Clark & Davis, Beefing
Up Product Warranties: A New Dimension in Consumer Protection, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 567
(1975); Denicola, The Magnuson-Moss Act: Making Consumer Product Warranty a Federal
Case, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 273 (1975); Eddy, Effects of the Magnuson-Moss Act Upon
Consumer Product Warranties, 55 N.C.L. REV. 835 (1977); Hey, The Magnuson-Moss Act and
the Uniform Commercial Code: A Survey of Warranty Protection in Consumer Sales Trans-
actions, 2 U. DAYTON L. REv. 233 (1977); Leete, A Look at the Consumer Warranty Problem-
The Federal Solution, 6 U. TOL. L. REv. 351 (1975); Magnuson, Fair Disclosure in the
Marketplace of Warranty Promises-Truth in Warranties for Consumers, 8 U.C.C. L.J. 117
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who encounter problems with warranted durable goods. 86 If the plaintiff
prevails in an action against the seller, the plaintiff is entitled to recover all
litigation expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended,
unless the court determines an award of attorney's fees to be inappropriate
under the circumstances. 87
The Magnuson-Moss Act's bold attorney's fees provision evinces clear
dissatisfaction with the effect of the American rule in a field in which
consumers need incentive to enforce their rights. 8 Despite this invitation to
consumer litigation, however, the Act has not revolutionized warranty law
in the manner envisioned by Congress. Although it has proven helpful, the
Act is no panacea. Not every wronged consumer is entitled to attorney's
fees under the Act. In addition to the court's discretion to deny such an
award,8 9 the right to claim fees is subject to both substantive and procedural
limitations. The issue is whether the Act sufficiently improves U.C.C. rem-
edies to render unnecessary the allowance of attorney's fees under the U.C.C.
as a means of improving consumer bargaining power. In order to understand
the Act's limitations, its history and major provisions must be briefly set
forth.
The stated purposes of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act are to "improve
the adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent deception, and
(1975); Rothschild, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Does It Balance Warrantor and Con-
sumer Interests?, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 335 (1976); Saxe & Blejwas, The Federal Warranty
Act: Progress and Pitfalls, 22 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 1 (1976); Schmitt & Kovac, Magnuson-
Moss vs. State Protective Consumer Legislation: The Validity of a Stricter State Standard of
Warranty Protection, 30 ARK. L. REV. 21 (1976); Schroeder, Private Actions Under the Mag-
nuson-Moss Warranty Act, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1978); Smith, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act: Turning the Tables on Caveat Emptor, 13 CAL. W.L. REV. 391 (1977); Strasser, Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act: An Overview and Comparison with UCC Coverage, Disclaimer, and
Remedies in Consumer Warranties, 27 MERCER L. REV. 1111 (1976); Note, Consumer Product
Warranties Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and the Uniform Commercial Code, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 738 (1977); Note, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Consumer Information
and Warranty Regulation, 51 IND. L.J. 397 (1976); Comment, The Federal Consumer Warranty
Act and Its Effect on State Law, 43 TENN. L. REV. 429 (1976).
For later discussions of cases arising under the Act, see Bixby, Judicial Interpretation of
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 22 AM. Bus. L.J. 125 (1984); Miller & Kanter, Litigation
Under Magnuson-Moss: New Opportunities in Private Actions, 13 U.C.C. L.J. 10 (1980).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (1982). The Act creates four separate causes of action: (1) the
failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under the
Act; (2) breach of written warranty; (3) breach of implied warranty; and (4) breach of service
contract.
87. Id. § 2310(d)(2). See, e.g., Dunlap v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., No. 179060 (Pima
County Super. Ct. May 29, 1981), aff'd, 136 Ariz. 338, 666 P.2d 83 (1983) (awarding $20,500
in attorney's fees); Black v. Don Schmid Motors, Inc., 232 Kan. 458, 657 P.2d 517 (1983)
($3,000); Royal Lincoln-Mercury Sales, Inc. v. Wallace, 415 So. 2d 1024 (Miss. 1982) ($2,162.50).
88. Bixby, supra note 85, at 154-55.
89. See Hanks v. Pandolfo, 38 Conn. Supp. 447, 450 A.2d 1167 (1982); Trost v. Porreco
Motors, Inc., 443 A.2d 1179 (Pa. Super. 1982); see also Peterson v. Bendix Home Systems,
Inc., 318 N.W.2d 50 (Minn. 1982) (plaintiff's post-trial motion for attorney's fees untimely).
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improve competition in the marketing of consumer products."' 9 Although
these three purposes are intimately connected, 9' the second one was clearly
the driving force behind the Act's inception and passage. Congress' main
concern was with the confusing, often incomprehensible language of product
warranties. 92 The Act consequently does not so much regulate the substantive
content of the transaction as it seeks to aid consumer comprehension of the
transaction. 93 In fact, in many ways the substantive warranty requirements
of the Act add very little to those of the U.C.C.
The Act is essentially concerned with the regulation of written express
warranties given in connection with "consumer products" made available
by "suppliers. '94 The Act does not require a seller to provide a written
warranty on any product.9 If a written warranty is offered, however, it
must meet certain statutory disclosure requirements.9 6 Written warranties
90. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (1982).
91. Professor Reitz has neatly tied together the reasoning behind the Act:
(1) Better informed consumers will make better judgments about how to spend
their dollars; (2) if consumers have greater advance knowledge about the warranties
that accompany goods, they will select those products that have stronger war-
ranties; (3) as warranty terms begin to affect marketability of goods, manufacturers
and sellers will be induced to compete on warranty terms; (4) this will provide
better warranty protection to consumers; (5) it could also lead to improvements
in the quality of the products, since strong warranties will not accompany weak
goods.
C. REITZ, supra note 85, at 23 (emphasis deleted).
92. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7702. As the court stated in Skelton v. General Motors Corp.,
660 F.2d 311, 313-14 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 974 (1982): "Magnuson-Moss is,
in the main, a remedial statute designed to protect consumers from deceptive warranty practices.
Its draftsmen believed that consumer product warranties often were too complex to be under-
stood, too varied to allow meaningful comparisons and too restricted to provide meaningful
warranty protection."
93. See Schroeder, supra note 85, at 1.
94. A "consumer product" is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (1982) as "any tangible
personal property which is distributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal,
family, or household purposes (including any such property intended to be attached to or
installed in any real property without regard to whether it is so attached or installed)." Whether
a particular item is a "consumer product" under the Act depends upon the actual use of the
product purchased by the consumer. Balser v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 512 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D.
Ga. 1981) (factual resolution required as to whether aircraft was normally used for personal,
family, or household purposes). Products which are not commonly used for consumer purposes
do not become "consumer products" merely because they are occasionally used for personal
or household purposes. Crume v. Ford Motor Co., 60 Or. App. 224, 653 P.2d 564 (1982)
(flatbed truck occasionally used by buyer to transport groceries when buyer went to town on
business not a "consumer product").
A "supplier" is defined in IS U.S.C. § 2301(4) (1982) as "any person engaged in the
business of making a consumer product directly or indirectly available to consumers."
95. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(2) (1982).
96. [h,. Act in §§ 2302(a) and 2302(b) authorizes the Federal Trade Commission to pro-
mulgate rules and regulations governing warranty information disclosure. Matters subject to
mandatory disclosure are listed at 16 C.F.R. § 701.3 (1985).
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must be labelled as either "full" or "limited" warranties. 97 A full warranty
normally implies greater protection for the consumer than a limited war-
ranty. 98 Although the Act creates no implied warranties not already existent
under state law, 99 it does provide that a seller offering any written warranty
may not disclaim any implied warranty. 00
At least three substantive provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Act can op-
erate to provide less protection to the consumer than the U.C.C. Under
these provisions, the consumer's right to attorney's fees is in some way
restricted, either by conditioning his cause of action or precluding it alto-
gether. The consumer in these circumstances may be forced instead to bring
his action under the U.C.C. and pay his own attorney's fees.
The first restriction on the right to recover attorney's fees is made express
by the statute. Before the consumer-plaintiff may initiate a lawsuit under
the Act, the seller must be given an opportunity to cure.' 0' The U.C.C.
contains no parallel provision. Although U.C.C. section 2-508(1) authorizes
sellers to cure defective tenders while time remains for performance, 02 it in
no way conditions the buyer's right to institute legal proceedings. The op-
portunity to cure required by the Act can be seen as a compromise between
the consumer's right to recover attorney's fees and the refusal to permit
disclaimers of implied warranties. 03 This requirement is not, of course, fatal
to the consumer's cause of action, but it can prove troublesome. Although
most consumers ordinarily would prefer a satisfactory cure to an action for
damages, most would ordinarily prefer a properly functioning new product
to a repaired product."34 After all, despite claims to the contrary by man-
ufacturers, it is not clear that every new product can always be wholly
fixed. 0 1 If the repaired product proves unsatisfactory to the consumer but
his warranty action fails, the Act will have deprived the consumer of his
97. 15 U.S.C. § 2303 (1982).
98. See C. RmiTz, supra note 85, at 46-61.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(7) (1982).
100. Id. § 2308(a); see C. REITz, supra note 85, at 63-71.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(e) (1982).
102. U.C.C. § 2-508(1) provides: "Where any tender or delivery by the seller is rejected
because non-conforming and the time for performance has not yet expired, the seller may
seasonably notify the buyer of his intention to cure and may then within the contract time
make a conforming delivery."
103. See Comment, The Federal Consumer Warranty Act and Its Effect on State Law, 43
TENN. L. REv. 429, 444 n.77 (1976).
104. In Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968), a case
concerning a new car with a defective transmission, the court noted that
every new car buyer has a right to assume and, indeed, has been led to assume
by the high powered advertising techniques of the auto industry-that his new
car, with the exception of very minor adjustments, would be mechanically new and
factory-finished, operate perfectly, and be free of substantial defects.
Id. at 452, 240 A.2d at 202.
105. See Nat'l L.J., July 4, 1983, at 40, col. 4.
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earlier legal action, and he will now as the losing party be forced to pay
his own attorney's fees. Even if the consumer prevails in this action, his
recovery will have been postponed due to the opportunity to cure require-
ment.
Two other substantive provisions of the Act can potentially restrict the
consumer's right to recover his attorney's fees.' °6 First, a written limited
warranty under the Act may limit the duration of the implied warranty of
merchantability to that of the written warranty, if the limitation is cons-
cionable and set forth plainly on the face of the warranty.'0 7 Section 2-725(1)
of the U.C.C., on the other hand, prohibits the parties from shortening the
period of limitation of an implied warranty to less than one year. 08 A written
warranty which is limited to less than one year apparently may under the
Act, but clearly not under the U.C.C., contain language limiting the implied
warranty to the same duration.'09 Professor Reitz, noting this difficulty, has
voiced skepticism that the courts would accept such an interpretation of the
Act. 10 Nevertheless, he recommends congressional reconsideration of this
provision,"' which no reported cases as yet have had occasion to construe.
Second, a full warrantor under the Act may exclude or limit consequential
damages for breach of any written or implied warranty, if such limitation
or exclusion appears conspicuously on the face of the warranty." 2 To the
extent the Act permits a manufacturer to disclaim responsibility for personal
injury resulting from a defective product, it is directly contrary to U.C.C.
section 2-719(3), which make limitation of such damages prima facie un-
conscionable." 3 It seems highly improbable that the Act was intended to
permit such a result, although again there are no reported cases dealing with
the question. It is more likely that the Act uses the term "consequential
damages" to mean economic loss and not personal injury.' '4 Even if thig is
so, the consumer's remedy for personal injury caused by the warranted
defective product lies in a products liability suit, and the plaintiff is re-
sponsible for his own attorney's fees. Courts directly addressing the issue
have held that personal injury claims arising from breach of warranty are
not cognizable under the Act.' '5
106. Clark & Davis, supra note 85, at 611-12.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) (1982).
108. U.C.C. § 2-725(1).
109. Clark & Davis, supra note 85, at 611.
110. C. REITz, supra note 85, at 69-71.
111. Id.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3) (1982).
113. U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
114. Clark & Davis, supra note 85, at 611-12.
115. Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 748 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1984); Bush v. American
Motors Sales Corp., 575 F. Supp. 1581 (D. Colo. 1984); Gorman v. Saf-T-Mate, Inc., 513 F.
Supp. 1028 (N.D. Ind. 1981).
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Congress has also given the consumer a procedural roadblock under the
Act. Warrantors have been expressly encouraged by Congress to establish
informal dispute settlement mechanisms ("IDSM's") to mediate consumer
warranty disputes.' 6 If a warrantor establishes an IDSM which meets Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") standards, the warrantor may, in a written
warranty, condition the pursuit of any legal remedy upon resort to the
IDSM." '7 This provision by itself is not unreasonable. The desirability of
having available an efficient, low-cost procedure for settling consumer dis-
putes is evident. These mechanisms can facilitate compromises, decrease court
congestion, and save both disputants the potential costs of litigation. More-
over, Congress and the FTC have provided that an IDSM may not be used
unfairly as merely another impediment to legal redress. ' 8
The practical problem facing a consumer required to utilize an IDSM does
not arise when the mechanism fails to settle the dispute. If the dispute is
not resolved, the IDSM renders a nonbinding decision including all remedies
proper under the circumstances. The consumer may still proceed with liti-
gation under the Act." 9 The practical problem posed by the IDSM provision
arises when a settlement is actually reached. In such a case, it is not clear
that the consumer is able to recover his attorney's fees incurred in presenting
his case before the IDSM.' 20 The statute and regulations are silent on this
point. Once again, no reported case has considered the question, presumably
because so far relatively few sellers have accepted Congress' invitation to
create IDSM's.' 2' The regulations state that the decision of the IDSM shall
include "any remedies appropriate under the circumstances, including repair,
replacement, refund, reimbursement for expenses, compensation for dam-
ages, and any other remedies available under the written warranty or the
116. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1) (1982) states: "Congress hereby declares it to be its policy to
encourage warrantors to establish procedures whereby consumer disputes are fairly and expe-
ditiously settled through informal dispute settlement mechanisms."
117. Id. § 2310(a)(3). The FTC has established fairly elaborate minimum requirements for
IDSM's. 16 C.F.R. § 703 (1985). For an in-depth analysis of the operation of IDSM's, see
Rothschild, supra note 85, at 368-77.
118. Section 2310(a)(4) provides that the FTC may on its own initiative review the operation
of any IDSM. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(4) (1982). If the FTC finds that a particular IDSM does
not comply with FTC rules, the FTC may "take appropriate remedial action under any authority
it may have under this chapter or any other provision of law." Id.
119. The decision of the IDSM is admissible in evidence in the latter action. Id. § 2310(a)(3).
Although some practitioners see this as a great drawback to the IDSM provision, Nat'l L.J.,
July 4, 1983, at 42, col. 3, this reaction is probably overstated. Case law concerning IDSM's
is still remarkably scant, however, and does not shed light on the matter.
120. See C. RatTz, supra note 85, at 91-92.
121. One of the few cases thus far discussing IDSM's is Kravitz v. Homeowners Warranty
Corp., 542 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Pa. 1982). In that case, the plaintiff sought judicial review of
an IDSM established by the defendant. The court held that mere variance from FTC minimum
requirements does not render the IDSM in violation of the Act when the IDSM in question is
fair and clearly favors the consumer protection policies of the Act.
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Act (or rules thereunder)."' 22 Under this language, the IDSM apparently
could make an allowance for attorney's fees. If it does not make such an
allowance, however, the consumer may be compelled to accept an award
that provides for less than full compensation rather than risk litigation
attempting to recover full compensation. Denying the recovery of attorney's
fees incurred in the course of the settlement procedure would be contrary
to the policies of the Act.
Under several circumstances, therefore, the Magnuson-Moss Act can pro-
vide relief to the aggrieved consumer no greater than that of the U.C.C.
Yet the consumer's greatest hurdle to full redress under the Act lies not in
its substantive deficiencies or its procedural devices, but in the pioneering
nature of its attorney's fees provision. For a myriad of reasons, attorneys
have historically had a strong distaste for consumer claims 23 and were slow
to become aware of the ramifications of Magnuson-Moss. Attorneys re-
mained skeptical even after the potential for consumer litigation under ihe
Act became apparent. Since the Act left the award of attorney's fees to the
discretion of the court, many attorneys doubted that courts stubbornly
accustomed to the American rule would actually award fees commensurate
with the time expended when the recovery itself was modest. 24 Until at least
the early 1980's, therefore, Magnuson-Moss was largely ignored and only
infrequently irvoked. This fact is clearly demonstrated by the scarcity of
case law concerning the Act.
In the past several years, however, plaintiffs' attorneys have finally dis-
covered the Act and have begun to make use of its attorney's fees provision.
Consumer warranty claims have increased steadily in number since the pas-
sage of the Act and are not expected to decline in the foreseeable future. 25
Use of the fee-shifting provisions of the Act has proved advantageous in
conjunction with the substantive warranty provisions of the U.C.C. In Cham-
pion Ford Sales v. Levine,' 26 a Maryland couple purchased a new 1978 Ford
Granada from the defendant dealer. After the car had been driven 109 miles,
a defective engine valve broke off and fell into a cylinder, causing consid-
erable damage. The buyers decided they did not want a shop-rebuilt engine,
and demanded either a new car or a new engine. The dealer refused. The
buyer prevailed in an action to revoke acceptance under U.C.C. section 2-
122. 16 C.F.R. § 703.5(d)(1) (1985).
123. See Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 LAW & Soc'y REV. 115,
120-43 (1979).
124. In 1977, an informal study conducted by the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection
confirmed that attorneys were indeed suspicious of the discretionary nature of fee recovery
under the Act and favored settlement over litigation. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., AUTOMOBILE REPAIRS: AVOIDABLE COSTS 34
(Comm. Print 1979).
125. Nat'l L.J., July 4, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
126. 49 Md. App. 547, 433 A.2d 1218 (1981).
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608 and sought attorney's fees under the Act. The Maryland Court of Special
Appeals held that the buyers had satisfied the requirements of the Act and
remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of an appropriate
award. 27
The U.C.C.-Magnuson-Moss hookup exemplified by Levine is plainly of
great benefit to consumers aggrieved by a breach of warranty. This benefit
will not be available to all such consumers, however. The buyers in Levine
were entitled to attorney's fees because they prevailed in an action for breach
of implied warranty under the U.C.C.128 and afforded the seller an oppor-
tunity to cure. Not every consumer who can allege a breach of warranty
under the U.C.C. can utilize Magnuson-Moss. As discussed previously, many
attorneys were still largely unaware of the Act and will not have the foresight
to advise consumer-clients to allow the dealer to cure in order to allow
recovery of attorney's fees, especially since the U.C.C., the warranty statute
most familiar to lawyers, does not require that an opportunity to cure be
given. Also, it is apparent in Levine that the manufacturer had not established
an IDSM. In similar situations when the manufacturer has an IDSM in
place, the mechanism may ultimately resolve the dispute, but the consumer
apparently will be forced to bear his own attorney's fees. Such a consumer
will be reluctant to bring the claim in the first place, and the access-enhancing
policies of the Act will be of no avail.
B. State Legislation
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is not the only legislative response to
the unfortunate effect of the American rule in the consumer warranty field.
While the majority of states still rely on the provisions of the U.C.C. to
govern this field, others have taken steps to discard the U.C.C.'s restrictive
remedies. Numerous states have recently enacted laws which, in varying
degrees, complement U.C.C. remedies by expressly awarding attorney's fees
to certain successful consumer-plaintiffs.129 Viewed in conjunction with Mag-
nuson-Moss, this state legislation broadens further the opportunity for con-
sumers to spurn the U.C.C. and seek the protection of warranty statutes
that represent more sympathetically their interests. Nearly all of these statutes
are limited in scope, however, and most states have not yet enacted such
legislation. The question again is whether the existence of state consumer
127. Id. at 562-63, 433 A.2d at 1226-27.
128. Id. at 563, 433 A.2d at 1227.
129. See supra notes 130-33 & 138. A very few states have gone even farther by enacting
broadly applicable fee-shifting statutes which apply not only to consumer suits but also to a
wide variety of actions. In Alaska, attorney's fees generally are included in taxable costs.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010 (1983). Nevada courts are authorized to award attorney's fees when
the recovery is less than $10,000. NEV. REv. STAT. § 18.010(2) (1979).
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warranty legislation obviates the need to allow the recovery of attorney's
fees under section 2-715 of the U.C.C.
A very small number of states allow attorney's fees to be recovered by
consumer-plaintiffs who successfully assert the breach of any express or
implied warranty. California, 30 Maryland,' and Oregon 32 exemplify this
approach. The practical effect of such a provision is identical to allowing
the recovery of attorney's fees as an incidental or consequential damage
under U.C.C. section 2-715 in consumer warranty actions. In these states,
consumers' access to the courts remains uniformly unhampered regardless
of the purchase price of the product that is the subject of the dispute. 3
The most common state approach has been to limit the recovery of
attorney's fees to warranty actions involving certain products only. State
legislatures recently have shown particular interest in the field of new au-
tomobile warranties. 34 This legislative concern has resulted in a literal ex-
plosion of so-called "lemon laws" around the country. 35 At least twenty-
three state lemon laws have sprung up in the last four years, beginning with
Connecticut's in 1982.136 These statutes typically require automobile dealers
and manufacturers to replace an automobile or refund its purchase price,
minus an allowance for the consumer's use of it, if any defect which sub-
stantially impairs the value of the automobile to the consumer is not repaired
after a reasonable number of attempts. 137 Roughly half of the lemon laws
130. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794(d) (West Supp. 1985).
131. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 14-407(c)(2) (1983).
132. OR. REV. STAT. § 20.098 (1983).
133. Oklahoma takes an intermediate position, allowing the recovery of attorney's fees in
actions for breach of express warranty only. Consumers successful in an action for breach of
implied warranty may not recover their attorney's fees. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 939 (West
Supp. 1984). The same result obtains in Minnesota through judicial construction of the Min-
nesota Consumer Protection Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.01-.35 (West 1982). Jacobs v.
Rosemount Dodge-Winnebago South, 310 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1981).
134. See generally Rigg, Lemon Laws Should be Written to Ensure Broad Scope and Adequate
Remedies, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 302 (1983); Minnesota Developments-A Sour Note: A
Look at the Minnesota Lemon Law, 68 MfIN. L. REv. 846 (1984).
135. Nat'l L.J., July 4, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
136. Aim. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1261 to -1265 (Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-179 (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 5001-5009 (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 681.10-.108 (West Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §§ 1201-1228 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1474-1477 (Supp. 1984); MAss. ANN. LAws ch.
90, § 7N 1/2, (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1985); MIN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.665 (West Supp. 1984);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.560-.579 (Vernon Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-501 to -507
(1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 60-2701 to -2709 (1984); 1983 Nev. Stat. 610; N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 357-D:1 to -D:8 (1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:12-19 to 12-28 (West Supp. 1984);
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a (Consol. Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.315-.375 (1983);
R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 31-5.2-1 to -13 (Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 55-24-101 to -109 (Supp.
1984); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36) § 6.07 (Vernon Supp. 1986); VA. CODE §§
59.1-207.9 to -207.14 (Supp. 1984); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.118.010-.070 (Supp. 1985);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218.015 (West Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 40-17-101 (Supp. 1983).
137. The New York lemon law is typical. A presumption that a reasonable number of attempts
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provide for attorney's fees.' 38 These laws are great boons to consumers,
especially those laws authorizing attorney's fees. Their restriction to auto-
rftobile warranties, however, limits their value to consumers, who usually
own numerous other expensive warranted products which have not been
accorded special statutory status.
To an even lesser extent than the Magnuson-Moss Act, state consumer
warranty legislation has not entirely solved the problem of providing full
redress to consumers successful in breach of warranty actions. The state
response has been peculiarly restrained. Consumers in the vast majority of
states may not, under state law, recover their attorney's fees in warranty
actions, unless the suit concerns an automobile and is brought in one of the
handful of states providing for attorney's fees in lemon law actions.'3 9
Automobile warranties are perhaps the most common subjects of warranty
disputes. Automobiles are expensive and a great deal is at stake when they
are plagued with defects. But other consumer products, such as boats and
home electronic equipment, can be equally expensive, and other less expensive
warranted products break down also. Consumers having warranty problems
with several products deserve to be made whole with respect to each product,
not only their automobiles.
CONCLUSION
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act was designed by Congress to comple-
ment state warranty law, primarily the U.C.C. Perhaps it is time state
warranty law was redesigned to buttress Magnuson-Moss. To a minor extent,
that process has already begun with the passage of "lemon laws" and other
warranty statutes awarding attorney's fees. The most fundamental reservoir
to repair have been made is raised when the defect is not fixed after four attempts within the
first 18,000 miles or within two years of delivery, or when the automobile is out of service for
repairs for 30 days during either period. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a(d) (Consol. Supp. 1984).
138. The lemon laws of Connecticut, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Wisconsin all allow attorney's fees. See
statutes cited supra note 136. For example, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-180 (West Supp.
1984) provides:
In any action by a consumer against the manufacturer of a motor vehicle, or
the manufacturer's agent or authorized dealer, based upon the alleged breach of
an express or implied warranty made in connection with the sale of such motor
vehicle, the court, in its discretion, may award to the plaintiff his costs and
reasonable attorney's fees or, if the court determines that the action was brought
without any substantial justification, may award costs and reasonable attorney's
fees to the defendant.
139. It is conceivable that the legislatures in those states not awarding attorney's fees to
successful lemon law plaintiffs refused to permit such an award because they deemed Magnuson-
Moss' attorney's fees provision to be sufficient. If so, their view of Magnuson-Moss would
appear to be overly optimistic. Many of these lemon laws were considered before the Act began
to be used with any frequency.
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of warranty protection, the U.C.C., has remained inexplicably inviolate.
Section 2-715 of the U.C.C. contains language capable of authorizing the
recovery of attorney's fees. The sole bar to permitting such a reading of
section 2-715 is the American rule, an anachronism endorsed solely to those
bound by stare decisis, whose asserted justifications do not extend to the
field of consumer warranty protection.
Either through reinterpretation or amendment, if necessary, the U.C.C.
should allow the recovery of attorney's fees by consumers. Neither the
Magnuson-Moss Act nor state consumer warranty legislation has yet in-
creased consumer bargaining power enough to force manufacturers into
improving both products and warranties. Until such an increase takes shape,
another fees provision should be placed where its impact will be the greatest-
in the U.C.C.
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